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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
L. BURT BIGLER and HERBERr.t, 
K. SLOANE, 
Plaintiffs. 
-v~.---
RAY P. GREEX\YOOD, GEORGE \V. 
~IORGAK and LAWRENCE A . 
. JOXES, as Commissioners of Salt 
Lake County, and as Directors of 
the Salt Lake CitY Suburban Sewer 
District, . 
Defendants, 
and 
SALT LAI{E COUNTY SUBUR,BAN 
IJIPROVE~fENT ASSOCIATION 
INC., a corporation, ' 
Involuntary Party Plaintiff. 
Cas~ No. 7915 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Just as defendants take issue .with our Statement of 
Facts, we dispute certain conclusions and statement of 
the facts contained in defendants' brief. While we do 
agree with the conclusion of defendants. on Page 3 that 
we could not now successfully challenge "the sufficiency 
of the steps taken under the statute to create a district," 
we only make this concession because the validating act 
was passed to correct any irregularities in connection 
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with the creation of the district. As will be demonstrated 
hereafter, that was the only intent and effect of the vali-
dation act. 
Even if we admit the one part of the statement on 
Page 4 that "the district has been valid and subsisting at 
all times since September 9, 1946," we maintain that we 
are correct and we again repeat that from April 5, 1948 
to October G, 1952 "the acquisition of a sewer system in 
the Salt Lake City Huburban Sewer District as provided 
in the resolution of March 18, 1947 and any amendments 
thereto, (was) abandoned." Although the district itself 
was not legally dissolved or rescinded, it was abandoned 
in the full sense of the word abandoned. It was deserted, 
forsaken, given up as a lost cause. Without going into 
semantics we repeat -it was abandoned. The original 
resolution of September 9, 1946 merely created "a special 
improvement district within the area hereinafter de-
scribed which is located at Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah." We, therefore, restate that prior to October 6, 
1952 there was no resolution, ordinance, or order imple-
menting the skeleton district, no provision for the ac-
quisition of a sewer system, nor a determination whether 
the district was created pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 2 to 7 of Chapter 6 (a) (a special assessment dis-
trict) or pursuant to the provisions of Section 8 of Chap-
ter 6 (a) (a revenue bond district). 
Until the commission passed a resolution similar to 
the resolution of March 18, 1947 (subsequently rescinded 
April 5, 1948) signifying that the district was no longer 
abandoned, we repeat, the district was to all intents and 
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pnrpo~t>~ defunct and abandoned. ':Phe minutes ol' the 
County Commi:.-~ion, the record in thi:.- en:.-P, lPad~ to no 
other conclusion. 
·on Page 7 of defendant's brief, the i1nplication is 
given that li,-!:2-i owiH'r~ filed without prote~t. \Ye admit 
that application~ for service frmu this number were filed 
hut we claim, and if evidence was taken we would prove, 
that a majority of the :2,{}-l-.) persons who signed the 
Holladay protest, because of roerrion, are a1nong the 
G,-!:2-i. Furthermore, the Court should bear in mind, that 
defendant~ did not make available to the citizens a fonn 
for filing under protest. 
\Ye take serious exception to the statement of the 
first paragraph on Page 8. The presentation at the mass 
meetings were not detailed, presented only the affirina-
tive ~ide of the picture, and the plan~ presented were not 
based on a feasibility report, nor did they confonn cmn-
pletely to what was finally incorporated in the bonding 
resolution. The suggestions and objections were not met. 
To cite Exhibits S as support for this is false. The ex-
hibit, which is only minutes of a meeting, states: "Dif-
ferent phases of the sewer plan were discussed. The 
oral agreements reached at this 1neeting are to be put 
in writing and approved* * *." The record fails to show 
what the agreements were, and the minutes fail to show 
that the commission approved anything suggested. On 
the contrary, three of those persons representing the 
opposition at this meeting are now mmnbers of the plain- . 
tiff's assoeiation and, as officers, are still attempting 
through the association's efforts to have the objections of 
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2,645 protestants met. Further, the deadline for appli-
cations, extended to September 2, 1952, had passed prior 
to this meeting; in order to coerce more people into 
signing applications, the deadline was thereafter "gra-
ciously" extended to those who had signed the Holladay 
protest. As to defendants' challenge, the association's 
members are prepared to stand and be counted. The issue 
is not, however, how many members we have or how 
many applications were filed or how many protest signa-
hues were received. The issue is, has the County Com-
mission act validity or, on the contrary, as any property 
owner been deprived of his rights by the misapplication 
of an unconstitutional statute and by the defendantR' 
arbitrary and unreasonable acts. 
Defendants lay great emphasis throughout their 
brief on the nun1ber of types of applications. Although 
five methods of applying for service might have been 
finally available, only two exhibits-one and four were 
publicized originally. It is admitted by the defendants 
that of those owning existing houses not a single person 
paid cash under the contract known as Exhibit 5 and only 
six posted . the $54.00 bond under the application known 
as Exhibit 4; the remainder signed Exhibit 1, the public-
ized application thus subjecting their property to a lien. 
On numerous occasions defendants state that only one 
of the five methods of applying for service provided for 
a lien if ·the bill became 90 days delinquent. We refer 
the court to these exhibits and submit that four of 
the five exhibits have the lien provision and only Exhibit 
4 omits this lien provision. 
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Finally we ~nb1nit t11a.t defendant'~ empha~iH on tlw 
percentage who haYe filed applications completely ig-
nores the a<hnissions 1nade in their pleadings. In order 
to ::'eenre this percentage of application~. a penalty wa~ 
threatened, which according to defendants' own adinis-
~ion in Parag-raph G of their AnHwer wa~ ••eoer::-;ivP in 
nature." 
POIXT I 
LACK OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
(a) CHAPTER 23 B, LAWS OF UTAH, 1947, DOES NOT 
VALIDATE THE COMMISSION'S POWER TO ISSUE REVE-
NUE BONDS. 
Defendants' first point in its brief is that the valida-
tion act, Chapter 23 B, Laws of Utah 1947, is ail the statu-
tory authority needed. Although it was originally clailn-
ed that this act ratified all acts taken prior to May 13, 
1947, the gist of defendants' n1ain affirmative defens~ 
is that this validation act gives legislative sanction to 
everything that has been done. 
In reply to this argument, we believe that the act it-
self should be paraphrased in order to detennine its true 
meaning. Because the act is all one sentence, it appears 
more involv~d than it really is. We submit that the act 
states the following: If a Board of County Commission-
ers purporting to act under the authority of Chapter 6 
(a) had theretofore purported to create a sanitary dis-
trict and had theretofore provided for the issuance of 
revenue bonds, all proceedings in connection with the 
project were validated, ratified, and corfirmed despite 
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any irregularities, and despite any failure to observe 
statutory requirements as to filing of petitions. rrhe 
provisions of all prior proceedings were declared to be 
valid and enforceable and the Board was authorized to 
proceed with the issuance of bonds and to make changes 
in the details of the bonds thereafter. When the bonds 
were delivered and paid for, they were declared to be 
valid and binding and fully negotiable. 
We do not dispute defendants' citations but we do 
clailn that there are limitations on the curative power 
of the legislature. 
Where there is no law authorizing the commission's 
actions or where there is no power to act because of lack 
of jurisdiction, the legislature cannot retroactively grant 
the power. See Daggett v. Lynch, 18 Utah 45, 5-± P. 1095 
and in re Christensen's Estate, 17 Utah 412, 53 P. 1003. 
Chapter 23 B was not enacted as a retroactive grant of 
power nor was it meant to serve as retrospective author-
ity, but it was enacted only for the purpose of curing ir-
regularities or failures to comply with existing statutory 
requirements. To construe this deliberate corrective 
legislation to be retroactive enabling legislation would be 
attributing more to the act than the legislature ever in-
tended. 
We sub1nit that the sole purpose of this act was to 
cure any irregularities which may have occurred in the 
c;reation of the district prior to ~1arch 13, 1947 and to 
validate, ratify, and confirm any actions taken prior to 
March 13 to issue revenue bonds, regardless of whether 
or not the statutory requirements had been complied 
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with. r:ro impute nwre to this aet requires g-oing- heyond 
the terms of the act itself, and require~ presuming that 
a prospective effeet rather than the retroad iYP ,·ali da-
tion was intended by the legislature. 
The legislature may validate actions taken prior to 
the time of the passage of an act. It cannot and certainb· 
did not intend to validate, ratify, and confirm actions to 
he taken by a Board of County Com1nissioners without 
knowing what such actions would he. A~ stated hy de-
fendants, Chapter ~3 B, Law~ of Utah 1947 was passed 
~[arch 13, 19-!7. On this date, the Board of County Com-
missioners of Salt Lake County had by a resolution and 
an order dated September 9, 1946, created a special im-
provement district. The County Commission and the 
Fiscal Agent was justifiably concerned whether the stat-
utory requirements that a petition of "10% of the people" 
be filed had been 1net. To avoid this question, the valida-
tion act was passed. After it was passed the first resolu-
tion, the ordinance, and the bonding resolution of March 
18, 1947, was passed by the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Salt Lake County. How can the defendant-; 
claim that the act of :March 13, 1947, expressly validated 
the proceedings thereafter taken by the Board on l\iarch 
18, 1947, particularly when the act contains the word 
"heretofore"? 
'Vhile it is true that the validation act was not ap-
proved until March 19, 194 7 and did not hecome effective 
until l\Iay 13, 1947, curative legislation should not be 
given prospective effect. 
"\Ye are acquainted with the rules of law that a stat-
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ute should be construed in relation to its effective date, 
however, we have been able to find a case which inter-
prets a curative act such as the one under discussion. 
Rather than to adopt an unreasonable interpretation 
that the legislature intended to validate proceedings 
taken subsequent to the passage of the legislation but 
prio~ to the effective date of the legislation, it is more 
logical to determine that the legislature intended to 
validate only those proceedings that had heen taken prior 
to the enactment. See Snidow v. l\iontana IIome for the 
Aged, 292 P. 72:2 where the Supreme Court of .Jfontana 
held that a curative act "operates only on conditions al-
ready existing, and, in a sense can have no prospective 
operation * * *. It goes without saying that the curative 
provision of the 1927 amendment was designed to cure 
defects in past transactions." 
·(b) CHAPTER 6 (a), TITLE 19, DOES NOT CONFER 
THE NECESSARY POWERS. 
In attempting to answer our contention (original 
brief, pp. 11, et seq.) that Section 8 of Chapter 6a, Title 
19, U. C. A., 1943, confers no authority upon Boards of 
County Commissioners to engage in revenue bond financ-
ing except in connection with projects and special im-
provements appropriate and possible under the laws of 
the United States relating thereto, the defendants arrive 
somehow at the c~mclusion that the language of the first 
sentence of Section 8 authorizes such financing for any 
type of project or special improvement created as pro-
vided by Section 1 of Chapter 6a, supra, (defendants' 
brief, pp. 16 and 17). The least that can be said of this 
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conclusion i~ that it ignon~~ the express and unambiguous 
language and the grannnatical constrndion of the find 
sentence of Section~' ~upra, particularly the word~ "~ueh 
of said projecb and special improve1nent~." 1'he fir~t 
:-'entence of Section .S, ~u pra, must be analyzed as follow~: 
•"The board of countY eonunissioner~ of anY 
county creating special i;nprovement~ as herei~­
before described (as described in Heetion 1 of 
Chapter (ia) i:; hereby authorized to ereate and 
operate such of said proj~ts and ~pecial improYP-
Inents (such of the projects and special improve-
ments described in ~ection 1 of Chapter 6a) a~ 
may be appropriate and possible under the laws 
of the United ~tates relating thereto (under Act:-: 
of Congress), as self-liquidating projects, and in 
connection thereu·ith (in connection with such of 
the projects and special improve1nents described 
in Section 1 as are appropriate and possible under 
Acts of l'ongre~s relating thereto) to enter into 
the necessary contracts with the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation of the l~nited States, or 'vith 
any other private or public agency, person, cor-
poration, or individual, for the purpose of pro-
viding funds with which to finance the proposed 
project or improveuwnt (one of those described 
in Section 1 which is appropriate and possible 
under Acts of Congress." (Italics and bracketed 
interpolation supplied.) 
Clearly there is nothing in the foregoing sentence that 
justifies the conclusion that the financing authorized is 
for "both types of projects and special improvements" 
(defendants' brief, p. 17). The authorization is expressly 
limited by the words such of said p1·ojects (projects au-
thorized to be created by Section 1) as may be appro p-
riate or possible under Acts of Congress and by the words 
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"in connection therewith" which can refer only to the pre-
ceding words "such of said projects," etc. There is no 
conjunctive or disjunctive in the pertinent language and 
nothing else that suggests an "either or both" meaning. 
Nor is there anything that is susceptible of the "alson 
construction urged by the defendants in their argument 
on p. 17 of their brief. 
The construction which we urge is a reasonable one, 
the defendants to the contrary notwithstanding. In our 
main brief (p. 12, et seq.) we discuss the federal statute 
(the E1nergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932) to 
which Section 8, supra, was so obviously geared and 
which most certainly prompted the addition of Section 8 
to the measure in committee. The defendants voice no 
disagreement with this construction except to say that 
Section 8 was merely supplementary to Section 1 and 
authorizes the borrowing of money on revenue bond 
issues from private sources in connection with projects 
created and operated as authorized under Section 1 of 
the Act as well as in connection with projects "operated 
under appropriate laws of the United States" (Defend-
ants' brief, page 16). As we have demonstrated above, 
there is no basis for this construction because Section 8 
clearly limits the authority therein contained to financing 
in connection with "such of said project:;;" (those de-
scribed in Section 1) as may be appropriate and possible 
under the laws of the United States relating thereto. This 
is enabling legislation. The Legislature had no way of 
knowing precisely what projects or special improvements 
might be financed with Federal assistance then, or in the 
10 
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future, because the Federal Statute (Section G05h of the 
~~mergency Relief and Construction Act of 1 D:t2) refer-
red only to aid in the financing of projects "authorized 
under Federal, Rtate, or 1nnnicipal law which are self-
liquidating in character" and the determination as to 
what specific type of project8 might be so financed was 
left to the rule-making power of the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation. Thi~ explains the use of the language 
··~nc-h of said projects and special in1prove1nents as llla)' 
he appropriate and possible under the laws of the United 
~tate~ relating thereto," as it appears in Section 8. 
In effect, the defendants argue in the alternative that 
the addition of Section 8 was unnecessary because "Sec-
tion 1 was itself broad enough" to permit revenue bond 
financing (defendants' brief, p. 16) and that the addition 
of Section S was merely supplementary to such authority. 
This i~ 1nere tautology. Section 1 does not authorize 
revenue bond financing. It authorizes boards of County 
Commissioners 
"to provide for the cost of such special im-
provements by leryinq asscs.r...·ments against the 
property benefited by such special i1nprovemenb: 
or by imjwsinq fees, tolls, rrr)nfs or other charges 
for the use of such improvements or both." 
(Italics supplied.) 
The defendants would have the Court hold that the fore-
going authorization necessarily carries with it the au-
thority to engage in revenue bond financing fron1 private 
sources because the County Cominissioners could not 
otherwise carry out the purposes of the Act (defendants' 
brief, p. 17). On p. 15 of their brief they argue to the 
11 
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same effect by stating that districts have no current 
funds when created and that laborers and material men 
could not be made to wait for payment until a system 
is completed and tolls return the cost ; that special assess-
rnents could not be payable by everyone on an expensive 
sewer project in one payment at the beginning of con-
struction. In other words, the defendants would supply 
by implication a power which is not expressly conferred, 
on the theory that legislative intent would be thwarted 
if current funds could not be n1ade available at the out-
set of the construction of a project. For present pur-. 
poses it is unnecessary to debate the question whether 
current funds for district purposes could not, if neces-
sary, be supplied by other means, such as the issuance of 
revenue anticipation warrants, for example. The issue 
before the court is whether the cost of the project or 
funds for special il:nprovements could be supplied by 
revenue bond financing from private sources. This au-
thority for special financing must be found in Section 
R or in Section 1 of Chapter 6 (a), if at all, because other 
Utah statutes confer no general authority upon Board..: 
of County Commissioners for such financing and it cer-
tainly is not an inherent power of such Boards to issue 
revenue bonds. Section 8 of Chapter 6 (a) confers only 
a limited authority for revenue bond financing which 
does not include revenue bond financing from private 
sources and Section 1 in no way relates solely to provid-
ing the cost of special improvements by levying assess-
ments or by imposing charges for the use of the improve-
merits. From the power to provide the cost of a special 
12 
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improven1ent hy entunerated methods there may not he 
implied the power to provide ~uch cost h~T other mean~, 
howen•r, nnsati~fartory the entunerated methods may be. 
~[ark-Nasfell Y. City of Ogden, decided by this court 
.\ugust :27, 195:2. In thi:-; case the court clearly laid down 
the rule that grant~ of power to a municipality are to be 
strictly construed, and l.l r. Justice Henroid, speaking 
for the majority of the court, quoted with approval the 
:::tatement in its previous decision, in the case of Salt 
Lake City Y. RaYene, 1:2-t P. 2nd 537 that, "any fair, rea-
sonable, substantial doubt concerning the evidence of 
·power is resolved by the courts against the corporation 
and the power denied.'' Contrary to defendants' bold 
assurance that "there can be little doubt that the County 
Commission had the power to borrow n1oney" hy revenue 
hond financing through private sources, we respectfully 
submit that the County Commission was totaling lacking 
in such authority. 
(c) THE DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCTION IS NOT A 
CONSISTENT ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION. 
Defendants' argument (defendants' brief, p. 18) that 
the Boards' interpretation of Section 8, supra, is entitled 
to judicial respect because it has been consistent over the 
years is without merit, because we do not have here a 
long-standing administrative interp·retation of the type 
contemplated by the line of cases which established the 
legal principle relied upon by defendants. So far as we 
know, the project in controversy is the only instance of 
action under the statute involving revenue bond financ-
ing, and the defendants apparently know of no other 
13 
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instance because they refer only to the "board's construc-
tion in 194 7 and again in 1952" (defendants' brief, p. 
18). Two wrongs five years apart do not make a right as 
"consistent administrative interpretatjon" within the 
principal of the decisions relied upon. 
If we are to rely on this single administrative con-
struction by one County Board, we would be delegating 
this Court's right of interpreting the law to the unjudicial 
judgment of an executive body. 
(d) THE LEGISLATURE IS NOT PRESUMED TO 
HAVE ADOPTED THE DEFENDANTS' CONSTRUCTION IN 
PASSING THE VALIDATING ACT. 
For similar reasons, the argument by defendants 
(defendants' brief, p. 19) that the validation act of 1947 
approved the construction placed upon the act by the 
board of County· Commissioners, is without merit. The 
va:lidating act by its title and by its text relates to the 
curing of "errors and irregularities" in proceedings for 
the creation of sanitary districts and the authorization of 
the issuance of revenue bonds. It does not purport to 
validate proceedings or bond authorizations which were 
originally unauthorized. A usurpation of power can 
hardly be termed an "error or irregularity." It is clear 
that someone went to the Legislature and represented 
that a sanitary district had been created and that some 
time in the future revenue bonds were to be issued pur-
suant to the authority conferred by Chapter 6(a), Title 19. 
supra, but that a validating act was desirable because of 
possible errors and irregularities in the proceedings for 
the creation of such district, and that legislative action 
14 
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,,·a~ needed if the rt>venue bonds were to be n<'gotialllP 
when i~~ued. The Legislature, arting upon this repre-
sentation, enacted the validating act whieh does nothing 
more than cure any errors or irregularities in proceed-
ings for the creation of projerts and special improve-
menb appropriate and possible under the laws of the 
rnited States relating thereto and finanring authoriza-
tion in connection there"·ith. It does not yalidate errors 
and irregularities in connection with any other type of 
project or any other type of financing and it does not 
rure any original lack of authority. 
How could the legislature expressly recognize and 
then ratify the construction placed upon the act by the 
Salt Lake County Comn1ission prior to the time the cOin-
mission had construed the statute 1 When the validation 
act was passed by the legislature the only action taken 
h~· the Commission was to create the district and define 
its boundaries. Legislative recognition of the prior con-
struction by the County Cmnmission is not entitled to be 
given any weight by the court when there was no official . 
construction by the County Commission prior to the pas-
sage of the validating act. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS' ACTION UNDER CHAPTER 6 (a) 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendants in their brief have succinctly stated their 
position in respect to constitutional guarantees of due 
process. On page 41, the last sentence of the second para-
graph, they state: 
"HP(·ause in the sale of rPY<>nue bonds, the 
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district does not pledge the private property in 
the districts nor obligate itself to assess or tax 
the property of the district nor create a burden 
on the property in the district, it is not the taking 
property, and the due process clauses simply do 
not apply." 
As pointed out in our main brief, we cannot agree with 
this conclusion. Furthermore, as discussed in our brief, 
we con tend that the rules of the "special fund" doctrine, 
that is revenu~ bond financing, have been so breached 
under defendants' sewer plan, that the rules of the 
"special fund" doctrine simply do not apply in this case. 
On Pages 8 and 40 defendants state there were four 
payment methods available without lien provisions. The 
Court's attention is directed to the five application forms 
submitted as exhibits with defendants' answer. 
Exhibit 1, the application for individual user, carries 
the lien provisions. 
Exhibit 2, the multiple user application, carries the 
lien. provision. 
Exhibit 3, the application for the owner of three or 
more vacant lots, carries the lien provision. 
Exhibit 4, the individual application fonn which does 
not carry the lien provision but requires 18 months ad-
vance payment deposit. 
Exhibit 5, the provision for the payment of $750.00 in 
full and right to convert from time payment to full pay-
ment within a two-year period, carries the lien provision. 
Exhibits 3 and 5, to the best of our knowledge, were 
not provided for or available until after September 2, 
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1 ~)5~, after the Holladay petition wa.s filed and protm.;t 
made to the Connnission. Hence for practical purposeH 
they were not available to the public. 
The leaflets (referred to page li, defendants' brief) 
printed and distributed hy the Counnission had the fol-
lowing to ::-;ay with respect to liens on property: 
"16. \Yill the Application Place a lien on 1\I:· Prop-
erty'? K o. But the application will provide 
for a lien taking effect if owner becomes de-
linquent in payn1ents to the district. Any user 
who objects to this lien feature can pay hi~ 
eonnection fee in full, $150 or $250 as stated 
above, at the time he applies for service. Since 
it ha:-' been paid, no provision need he 
Inade for its collection. On the mopthly serv-
ice charge any person can post a bond or 
cash in the auwunt of $;)-t to assure payrnent 
for 1S months service and the application 
card will 1nake no reference to a lien. 
'"17. Can I avoid a lien on jf y Property if I an1 
X ot Able to Pay Cash and Post the $54"? 
Yes. There will never be a lien on your prop-
erty if you pay your own hill as agreed. The 
lien becmnes effective onl)· when you are 90 
days or more delinquent. The lien can be 
placed on record only where your account is 
6 months past due. The lien is released when 
your bill is paid. For exaruple, after you have 
paid the connection fee and your house serv-
ice line charge, the bill for 6 months service 
will be only $18. This would be the extent 
of the lien and it could be released hy paying 
the $18 and collection charges, if any. 
"lEt vVill There he a Lien on 1\f ~· Property to Se-
<·lue the unpaid Rills of Others 1 No. The 
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lien attaches only for your own delinquent 
bills. 
"19. What if I refuse to Sign Application or Con-
nect with the Sewer~ As in other communities 
where a sanitary sewer system is installed, 
a County Ordinance will require property 
owners to connect after sewer service is avail. 
able and that all other methods of disposal is 
abandoned, with penalties for non-compli-
ance." 
Defendants attempt to persuade the Court that the sign-
ing of applications carrying the lien provision was en-
tirely voluntary-a voluntary contract free from any 
coercion. The Court's attention is directed to "Exhibit 
U," the first resolution adopted l\farch 18, 19-t-7; page 4, 
Section 4 of the resolution reads: 
"That it being the intention to finance the 
installation of said sanitary sewer system and 
treatment and disposal plant under the issuance 
of revenue bonds which will be payable from the 
revenues to be derived from the operation of 
the system, and since it is contemplated that the 
charges to be made to the users of the system will 
constitute liens against the property in said dis-
trict, enforceable in the event of a default in the 
payment of such charges, based either upon the 
provisions of a service application agreement to 
be signed by the owners of said property or other-
wise, this resolution shall be filed for recording 
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County and when so recorded shall constitute no-
tice to all persons of the existence, either present 
or future, of such liens on the property in said 
district." (Italics ours.) 
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( Heean~e of thi~ provision, eYPry ah~traet on 
property in the distrirt notes this possible lien.) 
The people were led to believe that they might 
as well sign the application, even though it had a lien 
provision, since a lien would result in any event, and h~' 
~igning the application they could at least save the . 
$100.00 listed as a penalty for late sig·ning. This is the 
$100.00 penalty \vhich in their brief, defendants call an 
inducement (page -18) but which in their pleading, (para-
graph 6 (e) they admit was "coercive in nature." On page 
50 of defendants' brief with respect to our allegation that 
the County would shut off the culinary water if the serv-
ice bill were not paid, defendants state: 
"'"Che sewer district does not own nor control 
the water supply going to the residents of the 
~e,,·er district. The 1nost it can do is request co-
operation of a water cmnpany in this regard; and 
this request could hardly render the proceeds 
void.'' 
Have the defendants conveniently forgotten the provi-
sions of Section XII, paragraph 13, found on page 37 of 
"Exhibit U" ~ It reads: 
"The Board will require the occupant of an~r 
premises, the owner of which shall be delinquent 
for more than six months in the payment of the 
sewer charges imposed hereunder to cease to dis-
pose of sewage or industrial or commercial wastes 
originating fron1 or on such premises by discharge 
thereof into the system nntil such delinquent 
charges with all penalties for delinquencies shall 
have been paid, and, in order to enforce the pro-· 
visions of this paragraph and to prevent the cre-
ation of a health hazard, it i~ agrees that if any 
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such occupant shall not cease such disposal at th·~ 
expiration of a period of 30 days running from th~ 
giving of the notice to cease such disposal, it shall 
be the duty of any private or public board, body 
or person supplying water to or selling water for 
use on such premises to ceas~ supplying water to 
or selling water for use on such premises withir. 
five days after the receipt of notice of such delin-
quencies from the board, and if such public o!· 
private corporation, board, body or person shall 
not at the expiration of such five day period cease 
supplying water to or selling for use on such 
premises, then the Board shall be entitled to enter 
upon such premises, and it shall through an agent 
or employee so enter and shall sh'ltt off the suzJply 
of water to such premises." (Italics ours.) 
We submit that the number who signed Exhibit 1 (6,170, 
according to defendants' answer) as compared to thd 
number who signed Exhibit 4 ( 6, according to defendants' 
answer) adequately shows the effectiveness of this plan 
of "voluntary" subscription. 
Defendants in proposing the sewer pian, and now 
in their brief have used revenue bond finance measures 
where and when revenue bond financing suited their pur-
pose. They have used police power arguments, where and 
when police powers suited their purpose. They have used 
the features of assessment financing, where and when it 
suited their purpose. The rules of law relating to each 
are clear when each is confined to its appropriate sphere. 
Defendants have wrapped all of these features into a plan 
which they call "revenue bond financing" and attempt 
to justify the plan by segregating the plan into compact 
units and quoting law to support it within its unit sphere. 
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As pointed out in ou1; nmin brief, the plan considered 
as a whole, contains so many elenwnts of police power 
regulations, a~sessment financing, and revenue bond fi-
nancing, as to renwve the plan frorn the protection and 
rules of the "special fund" doctrine, and subjects the en-
tire plan to the usual constitutional protections-includ-
ing that of due process. 
\Ve submit that the above quoted proyisions of the 
resolutions and contracts, disregarding what may havP 
been said at mass n1eetings, or ''hearings" are, sufficient, 
we believe, to warrant the Court in hdding that tl~e pre~­
ent plan is outside the scope of the "special fund" doc-
trine and that the due proeess clauses certainly do apply 
in the present cast. \Ve believe that the above quoted pro-
visions of the resolutions and contracts are sufficient 
to warrant the Oourt. in holding that coercive means 
inherent in the proposed sewer system plan were suffi-
·~ient to vitiate the voluntary features required under 
the "special fund" doctrine. 
POINT III 
THE EFFECT OF THE REPEALING RESOLUTION OF 
OCTOBER 6, 1952. 
We cannot agree that ever sine(-. October 6, 1952 the 
status of proceedings in the district is exactly as it was 
on April 4, 1948. Affirmatively some $90,000 in advance 
payments was returned by the trustee; the public was 
led to believe that the Board intended to take no further 
action through the district to furnish sewer facilities; 
negatively the Board took no official action to revive an 
ahandoned project or to formally revive the commission'R 
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authority to act for the district. 
Defendants have ignored or bru.-:;hed aside the issues 
raised under Point 3 of our main brief. We believe that 
these illegal, arbitrary, and capricious acts of the defend-
ants cannot be justified on the broad ground that once a 
district is organized, its officers may run rough-shod 
over the rights of the people. Granted that the end is 
meritorious-the furnishing of a badly needed sewe1 
project-this does not justify using any means, no mattei 
how dictatorial they 1nay be. 
POINT IV 
THE OCTOBER 6, 1952 RESOLUTIONS SHOULD BE DE-
CLARED ILLEGAL AND VOID. 
A considerable part of Point 4 of our main brief de-
tailed and discussed the so-called •'amendments." Our 
purpose was to refute Para·graph 11 of defendants' an-
swer which reads as follows : "That the amendments to 
the proceedings which were validated, as is alleged in 
Paragraph 10 hereof, were relative to formal matters, 
which have in no way affected or diminished the effect of 
the validation act of 1947." 
This allegation, we believe, has in no way been sup-
ported in their brief, but on the contrary their defense 
has been changed. Thus on Page 59 of their brief, it is 
stated, "Defendants do not rely on the validating act for 
authority to make the amendments which petitioners de-
tail on Page 60 of their brief; .they rely on Chapter 6 (a), 
Title 19, Utah Code Annotated 1943." 
In other words, we must now conclude that the two 
bond resolutions of October 6, 1952 were not passed to 
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accomplish .. changes in the details of said bonds" hut 
wt>re new re~olutions enacted to acquire and finance an 
entirely different project than originally conte1nplated 
by the original sig·ners of the petition. No longer do de-
fendants clai1n legislative ratification of the proceeding;; 
under review but assert that acts •·have statutory author-
ization invigorated by Chapter :23 B .• , 
\Yith this concession in n1ind, we insist that it wa~ 
mandatory on the defendants to answer our pleadings in 
our brief wherein we raised specific illegal affirmative 
and negative acb. Instead of u~eeting these issues 
squarely, the present position of the defendants is: 
Chapter 6 (a) gives the Commission broad and unlimited 
authority to create a sewer district and to finance the 
cost by revenue bonds fron1 private sources; constitu-
tional guarantees do not apply, and ~pecific objections 
should not be exan1ined or passed upon now by thi" 
court because no one's property has been confiscated anrl 
the illegal phase of the plan may not be put into effect. 
The position of the plaintiff, on the contrary, is that this 
~uit has for one of its main purposes the testing of the 
legality of the October 6, 1952 resolutions wherein the 
defendants have adopted the final steps of the sewer plan. 
All that remains to be done is letting the construction 
contracts and selling and issuing the revenue bonds. 
Certainly it is opportune to adjudicate the issues now 
hefore third party rights intervene. Specifically, the fol-
lowing provisions of the resolutions, alleged as illegal 
ads in our pleading and demonsh·ated to be arbitrary 
and unreasonable in our main brief, have not been an-
swered: 
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1. The validity of the rescinding resolutions (Page 
59-61). 
2. The ultra vires act of permitting the Fiscal 
Agent to fix the interest rate to be paid (Page 62). 
3. The indefiniteness of the resolutions (Page G3). 
4. Proceeding without a feasibility report (Pages 
64-65 ). 
5. Authorizing bonds in excess of estimated cost 
(Pages 64-65). 
6. Reservation of the right to determine options and 
maturities of one fourth of the authorized issue (Pages 
65-66). 
7. Lack of hearings on the final plan prior to adop-
tion (Pages 66-69). 
We believe that the people of the district can look 
to this court to prevent such arbitrary acts jeopardizing 
their property and welfare and need not, as defendants 
argue, depend sole'ly on the judgment of officials over 
whom they have no control. 
TheTefore, it is respectfully submitted that our 
prayer be granted and that the defendants be prohibited 
from proceeding under the present plan. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALVIN I. 'SMITH 
HERBERT F. SMART 
Attorneys for Involuntary Party 
Plaintiff 
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